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I

The reader will immediately recognize that attempting to take
on the task of surveying as diversified a field of human inquiry
as development over the past formative two and a half decades is
somewhat presumptuous--a nd I thus hasten to assure the reader that
the views presented here will necessarily constitute only a per
sonal and partial statement, i.e., no effort will be made to try to
cover the waterfront and touch every piece of a very complicated
mosaic.

The ruminations which follow should, rather, be viewed as

one observer-parti cipant's assessment of what we may have learned
in recent decades.
Our focus will be on changes in the state of the arts.

But,

as in other areas of social science, development theory frequently
lags behind--and is responsive to--changes in the actual or per
ceived nature of the social problem.

Consequently, our reflections

will necessarily represent something of a weave between changes in
actual LDC performance and achievement,

in the weight of changes
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in societal goals--both at the real and the rhetorical level--and
changes in the analytical framework.

Performance and objectives

will be treated briefly in Section II, with Section III focussing
on related progress in conceptualization in a number of important

dimensions.

Finally, in Section IV, we intend to, again briefly,

reflect on the policy implications, for rich and poor, of this new
and hopefully higher level of theoretical awareness--at least as
far as one's necessarily myopic view permits.

II

It is now commonplace to note that the overall performance of
the developing world during the SO's and 60's, in terms
of aggre+.
.
gate growth rates, exceeded both official goals and private expec
tations.

It is equally well understood, however, that this accept

able performance of annual growth in excess of the 5% U.N. target,
and of exports growing atJD% on average, obscured an increasing
divergence among LDC's,and within LDC's.

Among LDC's we have seen

the emergence of a so-called Third World, on the one hand, and a
Fourth World, on the other.

The Third World is itself composed of

two rather different sub-types, one, the natural-resources-rich
group--in the extreme, the oil countries--the other, those rela

tively few developing countries which have managed to combine an
abundant unskilled labor supply with entrepreneurial capacity for
the massive expansion of labor-intensive output and exports, i.e.,
the Taiwan and Korea prototype.

These two sub-groups have grown at
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rates of more than 10%, with exports often in excess of 20% or 30%
annually.

The Fourth World, on the other hand, comprising such

large, heavily populated developing countries as India and Bangla
desh--as well as those just emerging from agrarianism into dualistic
growth, e.g~, some Central African countries and a few in Asia and
Latin America--comprises more than half of the population of the
developing world--and has experienced virtual stagnation at levels
of per capita income below $100 a year.

The recent triple blow of

oil, fertilizer and food crises merely served to accentuate and
highlight this growing divergence among LDC's.
Moreover, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that the
easy assumption as to what was happening to distribution within
both Third and Fourth World countries has been undergoing substan
tial reappraisal.

The notion has grown overwhelmingly that develop

ing societies have generally attended too much to the needs of current
in-groupsand future generations and too little to those of the
poorer members of the current generation, whose lot has generally
deteriorated, relatively,and in some cases even absolutely.

This

notion, in turn, has translated itself into more attention paid to
the problems of technology choice, employment, unemployment, and
participation in international trade as they affect the distribution of income across families and across regions, as well as the
existence of absolute poverty and the ability to satisfy some ill
defined set of "basic" human needs.
This increased level of questioning of the old-fashioned "grow
first--distribute later" notions of the 50 1 s and 60 1 s has, of course,
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been accompanied by an increasing volume of real world evidence to
the effect that higher growth rates do not necessarily guarantee
diminishing rates of unemployment or an improvement in the relative
distribution of income, or even the alleviation of low-end poverty.
In fact, the tendency is just as often reversed, i.e., we have
witnessed country after country reporting 6% or more overall growth,
side by side with increa~ing unemployment and polarization, e.g.,
as in Brazil and Mexico.

We have seen the much-heralded Green

Revolution of the late 60's effect major change in the countryside
but also bring in its wake increased maldistribution of income
related, in turn, to the maldistribution of land and such critical
current inputs as water, credit and fertilizer.

We have seen pre

viously well suppressed regional distribution issues entering center
stage in the wake of the actual disintegration of countries like
Pakistan and the recognition of sub?tantial tensions within others,
e.g., in the Philippines and Brazil.

There can be absolutely no

doubt that these issues are now dominant on the agenda of any po
litical or expert group concerned with development.

The rhetoric

has, of course, substantially outdistanced action.

But before we

chastise policy makers too much, we should remind ourselves that
the current "new orthodoxy" of concern with the downtrodden--echoed
in McNamara speeches and U.S. aid legislation, as well as LDC pro
nouncements--is indeed of very recent vintage.

As little as five

ye-ars ago, few academic economists could have seriously placed
these items high on their agenda of concern without running the risk
of intellectual ostracism; and policy makers, in rich and poor
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countries, would have risked even more.

The awareness gap has been

radically reduced; but now a new gap threatens both theorist and
policy maker, namely that between our new awareness of the broader
dimensions of development and our ability to trace the behavioral
interrelationships as a necessary condition for doing something
meaningful about it.

III

It is our purpose in this section to trace some of the main
advances in our understanding of the development process during the
past couple of decades and to relate them, where appropriate, to
more recent changes in the objective function articulated by most
developing country spokesmen and aid officials.
Perhaps the most important dimension of conceptual progress,
in our opinion, is the growing awareness that the analysis of growth,
employment and distribution must be viewed as integrally of one
cloth, with the focus on the existence and size of trade-offs among
these objectives.

The notion that employment and distributional

issues are best treated "after the fact," i.e., after all the
production/allocation dust has settled, has died hard.

There is

still a substantial body of theoretical literature which claims
that "trickle down" is likely to work, and a related body of more
policy tinged expert opinion to the effect that employment and
income distribution objectives should be met via "secondary strate
gies," e.g., public works programs and fiscal redistribution.
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Trickle down is still sufficien tly respectab le to have been the
1
basis of the so-called Prebish Report, 1970 s vintage, calling for

higher growth rates in Latin America in order to pull in the unem
ployed; and the preponder ance of work on income distribut ion and
poverty still emphasize s the potential redistrib utive effects of
tax and expenditu re policies, nationali zation and public works
programs.

1

The empirical evidence that has been accumula ting, on the
other hand, indicates that even if fiscal redistrib ution, after the
fact, were political ly and administr atively feasible, it would have
to assume completel y unrealist ic proportio ns to make a real dif
ference.

And, turning the problem on its head, it would take an

unreasona bly large exogenous shift in income distribut ion to
achieve anything meaningfu l in the way of a more employme nt-intensi ve
output mix.

2

Moreover, the advice that an increase in overall growth

targets from 5% to 8% would solve the unemployment problem is weak
on two grounds- -it is highly impractic al to locate the additiona l

fuel to make the old Model T move that much faster and, perhaps more
importan tly, even if sufficien t natural resources and/or foreign
capital could be harnessed , the accompany ing income distribut ion
outcomes are not necessari ly acceptabl e.

Finally, intrinsic admin

istrative and organizat ional difficult ies, at least in the mixed
economy LDC context, make a solution via major reliance. on a mas
sive public works program highly impractic al.
It is for these reasons that we count the gradually growing
consensus that these new dimension s of developme nt must be analyzed
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and solved as an integral part of the old as the most important
single step forward.

Simply put, we are not in a position to

"dethrone the GNP," as has been variously suggested, but rather we
must try to place it on an analytically sturdier throne.

This means

analyzing much more carefully than we have in the past what the
meaning of alternative growth paths--or alternative ways of achiev
ing a particular growth rate--might be in terms of the other things
we care about.
This, of course, may lead us to the conclusion that a change
in the nature of the growth path itself--i.e., the way in which
output is generated--can give us not only better employment and
distribution outcomes but more growth in the bargain.

On the other

hand, there may be trade-offs among these objectives; and the nature
of these trade-offs, i.e., the extent to which they are man-made
rather than inherent in the basic structure of development, is of
great theoretical and policy interest.

It is my belief that much

of our current and prospective progress rests on this ability to
integrate neo-classical or classical growth theory with a 1•igorous
statement of employment and equity considerations.
Among the more important ingredients in our theoretical capac
ity to deal with this new and broadened view of development is our
increased willineness to sector the typical developing economy into
meaningful components for purposes of general equilibrium analysis.
The literature on economic, social and technological dualism has a
long and distinguished history.

But the revival of classical

economics after Arthur Lewis' pathbreaking work,

3

and its application
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to contemporary problems of development, has represented a major
analytical advance--permitting us to trace the interactions over
time among sectors not homogeneous in structure and/or beha·.rior.
More recently, it has been recognized that so-called two-sector
models need to be modified by extension to three or four sectors,
e.g., along the lines of more than one traditional and more than
one commercialized sector, with possibly two urban and two rural
components emerging.

While controversy on this point persists,

there are more and more adherents now to the notion that meaningful
analysis in development requires breaking the economy down into a
few, sometimes heterogeneous, sectors in the dualistic tradition,
rather than the conventional treatment of many homogeneous sectors
in the input/output tradition.
A second and related advance permitting the more meaningful
simultaneous analysis of growth, employment and equity has been in
the area of recognizing the importance of typological differences
among developing societies.

In the immediate postwar period there

seemed to be two major prevailing views--one, that every LDC is
sui g2reris

and that only country-intensive studies were likely to

advance our understanding; the other, that a general theory of under
development applicable to all countries was within reach and that,
in the meantime, we could behave as if Afghanistan and Argentina
had more in comr:ion with each other than with any so-called mature
economy.

In more recent years, we may note a marked convergence

between these positions via the acceptance of the notion of half-way
houses or sub-families of LDC's differentiated by such features as
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size, resource endowment and other structural as well as, possibly,
behavioral characteris tics.

This trend is exemplified , on the one

hand, by the evolving work of Chenery and his associates,

4 which

has moved away from homogeneous SO-country samples and towards the
attempt to differentia te empirically among different country types;
on the other, expositors of development typologies, e.g., of the
land surplus and labor surplus school, have begun to open these
models LO trade and to more empirical treatment.

5

While this work

remains very much in flux, we seem to have growing agreement that
it is worthwhile to differentia te countries by size--thus under

lining the relative importance of trade--by the extent of dualism
or labor surplus--th us assessing the relevance of classical vs.
nee-classic al conditions in agriculture --and by the strength of
their natural resources base--thus determining the quantity of land
based fuel available for the transition effort.
It would be most appropriate here to note that one of the
early'µr~ph etS' in this area was Professor

as long ago

as 1955, differentia ted the small or open economy, which he called
"non-domin ant," and the natural-res ources-rich which he called
"expansion ist. 116

One might say that the profession has now moved

towards his view that we can usefully deal with development , at

this stage of our understandi ng,only through the development of
theoretical models which deal with conceptual

half-way houses or

sub-familie s; few would deny that there is transferab ility of know
ledge from one country case to another; but fewer still would ven
ture beyond the fond hope that our still evolving typological ly
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differentiated models may some day turn out to be "special cases"
of a "grand-daddy" general theory of development.
Closely related to this growing acceptance of the usefulness
of a typological approach has been the recognition that a fuller
explanation of the historical laboratory would have a substantial
pay-off for advances in development theory.

In the 40's and SO's,

the profession understandably was forced to concentrate on cross
sectional analysis of the less developed world as well as on the
history of the now advanced societies, including Western Europe,
Japan and, to a lesser extent, Australia, North America and other
"empty" continents.

By now, however, a quarter century later,

sufficient data have accumulated to permit us to look at developing
societies in an historical context and to try to isolate meaningful
sub-phases of development,

There is no reason to permit the un

fortunate "stages of growth" controyersy linked to the name of

W.W. Rostow 7 to inhibit us in this respect any longer.

While no

historical inevitability connotation is intended, developing societies do seem to move in certain transitional states between the
long epoc of open agrarianism and another long epoc of modern
growth.

8

One of the more common transitional states is one of

dualism, whether of the Lewis/Fei-Ranis or the Jorgensen/Kelley
Williamson type.

9

Moreover, there are some of us who believe that the dualism
sub-phase may itself be typically characterizable--to analytical
advantage--by distinct sub-phases, including a domestic market
oriented or primary import substitution sub-phase, followed by
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either an outer-oriented or export substitution sub-phase or the
prolongation of domestic market orientation via a secondary import
substitution sub-phase.

The identification of such sub-phases.:_

based on changes in the underlying resource endowment as well as
in accommodating changes in the official policy package combin
ing

to fundamentally affect domestic as well as trade relations-

constitutes, we believe, an essential ingredient in advancing our
understanding of development.

For example, the extent to which

growth, employment and income distribution objectives of a society
are mutually reinforcing or competitive depends very much on the
sub-phase in which a society finds itself--as well as, of course,
on the LDC sub-family to which it belongs.

By way of such illustration only, for the labor surplus economy
which moves from primary import to export substitution, e.g.,
Taiwan, we can clearly identify tur~ing points between sub-phases
and note substantial contrasts in the "before and after" performance.
During primary import substitution, focussed on infant industrial
or entrepreneurial protection and fuelled by land-intensive exports
and foreign capital, we would expect trade-offs to be more pro
nounced; during export substitution, focussed on penetrating inter
national markets by combining maturing entrepreneurial capacity
with "unlimited' supplies of labor, we would expect such trade-offs
to be substantially reduced, if not altogether eliminated.

10

On

the other hand, countries which persevere in secondary import
substitution--often combined with some export promotion (i.e.,
subsidized exportation)--in consumer durable, capital, and intermediate

-12--

goods

will

find such trade-offs becoming increasingly severe. 11

What makes such typology and time-oriented analysis more analyt
ically feasible today than a quarter century ago is a number of
specific advances in our understanding of alternative growth paths.
One such advance clearly is a revised view of technology choice and
technology change.

view

12

It has not been all that long that the Eckaus

of essentially fixed proportions, and consequent technologi

cal unemployment, was dominant in the LDC literature, with little
flexibility in either output or technology mixes,

Added to that

was the notion making a virtue of capital intensity even in a labor
surplus context, namely, the need for large profit and low wage
shares to ensure high saving and low population growth rates.

13

Substantial differences in the industry-specific technology
actually found to be most profitable in developing countries over
time, as well as the existence of substantial cross-sectional dif
ferences within developing countries for the same industry as one
moves across scales, have cast serious doubt on the first proposi
tion.

The new conventional wisdom with respect to technology

choice is more nearly that, while some industries, especially con
tinuous process industries, are clearly intrinsically not as flex
ible as others--no matter what the environment--in most industries
substantial efficient choice does exist across countries and across
scales within countries.

This flexibility is most pronounced in

the core processes of discrete or batch production, in machine
peripheral activities, as well as with respect to plant-saving
possibilities.

While "small is not always beautiful"--since it may
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be inefficient--the conventional wisdom has now swung to the recog
nition that under less distorted relative price environments, growth
and employment at least can be rendered much more compatible--via
appropriate technology choices--and that, using the foreign trade
mechanism, appropriate technology choices will also permit a wider
range of output mix variability.
The overwhelming burden of the evidence is consistent with the
basic notion that, in a developing country which is open and not
too large in size, less relative factor and commodity price distor
tions, along with the reduction of institutional barriers to infor
mation, procurement choice, etc., may be expected to produce a
substantial increase in employment--in spite of a pronounced depend
ence on imported machinery in the first instance.

There exists,

in other words, substantial potential flexibility in both the
initial choice of technology from aJ?road and in the domestic adap
tation potential "on top of'' such imported technology.

Adaptation

possibilities may, in fact, be quantitatively more important than
the range of shelf technology choice which is often more heavily

constrained and only partially illuminated.

Nevertheless, the two

acts are closely interrelated in theory and practice, i.e., economies
wh .i Cii try to borrow ahead of their skill levels will find it more
difficult to assimilate what they borrow, quite aside from incurring
the higher expense of the initial choice.
It may be well for us to note that the adaptive technology
argument in industry may be more closely related to the situation
in agriculture than the profession has yet been willing to acknowledge.
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For instance, agricultural economists are now coming around to the
idea that, while the contribution of international research on new
hybrids, etc., has been substantial--and rightly ballyhooed--it has
probably been overstated relative to the need for adaptive national
research to protect new varieties against disease and ensure the
continuity of such "Green Revolutions. 1114

Agricultural technology

is more of a public than a private good and thus more easily appro
priated and diffused.

With respect to industrial technology, there

fore, we might do well to distinguish between technology proper,
where the analogies to the better understood agricultural sector
may hold fairly well--in spite of the lower level of competition
and higher level of appropriability--and the product and taste
differentiation type of "technology" which is a horse of a different
color and not really treated here.

15

These analogies may be espe-

cially relevant in light capital go9ds,

16

cement, brick and other

relatively homogeneous product industries and at the medium and
small-scale end of the spectrum.
The second aforementioned proposition has proven equally doubt
ful, i.e., there is no clear evidence that the admittedly higher

saving rates out of a larger profit share are sufficient to over
come the lower absolute levels of output, and profits, resulting
. ine
. ff'iciency.
.
17
f rom s ubstanti"al static

The posited relationship

of technology choice to population growth has never been established.
Small wonder that the explanation as to why, in spite of large en
dowment differentials, technology choices are not, in fact, as dis
similar as we might expect has been shifting elsewhere.

If countries
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do not, in fact, always take full advantage of the potential that.
exists in terms of known technology shelf choices, this may have
more to do with imperfect information channels or the ability of
entrepreneurs, due to the existence of monopoly profits, to indulge
their engineering preferences--q uite aside from the most common
explanation, i.e., the effect of severely distorted relative factor and
commodity prices.
The choice of the direction of technology change, a closely
related issue, is still something more of a mystery because, as in
advanced economy growth theory, we have no analytically sound inno
Yet

vation inducement mechanism on which to base our reflections.

most of us do recognize that the Hayami-Ruttan type of inducement
. 1·k
. 1 ture is
. d to agricu
· lB as l oose 1 y applie
i ely to b eat
mech anism

work, i.e., that labor surplus economies with expectations of a
continuing relative shortage of capj.tal and abundance of labor are
more likely to seek labor-using or capital-stretch ing innovations-
just as societies in which capital can be expected to grow secularly
faster than labor have shown evidence of increasing the pool of
labor-saving innovations.

What is admittedly less clear, and a

subject of considerable theoretical and practical interest, is
whether or not the pool of labor-using innovations, mainly in the
fonn of plant floor rearrangements , the speeding up of machines,
etc., is likely to be as easily replenished as the pool of labor
saving innovations in Western European and U.S. experience.

More

likely, additional adaptations of a labor-saving type will require
the impetus of additional acts of shelf technology borrowing.

In
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agriculture, we have gradually swung to the realization, moreover,
that as important as international research inputs may have been,
e.g., in the case of the Green Revolution, it is national adaptive
research responses which are going to be crucial in establishing
the nature of the employment/output generation nexus immediately
and, perhaps more importantly, in determining how self-sustained
technology change will ultimately be. 19

In industry, imported tech

nology change is more nearly a privately appropriable commodity in
most instances and we are still less able to disentangle the respec
tive rolesof public and private sector R & D and information access
in the borrowing and adaptation processes.

However, the overall

importance, for growth and labor absorption, of the size of the
innovational effort apparently increases over time, relative to the
20
.
.
qual i·ty or b"ias o f t h e innovation.
In summary, there is suhstanti~l consensus today that tech
nology change, both in terms of its strength and in terms of its
bias, represents perhaps the single most important element in effect
ing the reduction and possibly the elimination of any trade-off
between employment and growth objectives.

Actual country experience

indicates that there exists a "deviant" minority of labor surplus
developing economies which have, in fact, created an environment
conducive to appropriate technology choice and technology change-
during their export substitution suh-phase--and have apparently
been able to entirely eliminate the conflict between employment
and growth.

In Taiwan, for example, growth rates accelerated

during the 1960's and unskilled labor shortage replaced labor
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surpluses by the end of the decade.
While growth and employment are now increasingly viewed as,
at least potentially, compatible, there is still a good deal of
controversy surrounding the question of growth vs. income distribu
tion.

In fact, the majority view here clearly holds that, especially

as growth first gets under way, "things must get worse before they
can get better."

The results of Kuznets, and later, Oshima, using

21 and those of Adelman and Morris, employing
cross-sectiona l data,

more sophisticated techniques on a broader set of cross-sectiona l
22
•
h e same d.irection,
•
•
• d ata, point
•
int
socio-economic

Most observers

seem to have found this evidence persuasive for purposes of prog
nostication for individual developing countries over time.

Kuznets,

for example, sees this outcome as a necessary concomitant of in
creasing levels of profit and rent-fed accumulation, as growth gets
under way, plus the effect of shift~ in the center of gravity from
"more equal' to'!l.ess equaJ!'sectors (agriculture to non-agricultur e).
A. Lewis notes that, while the unlimited supply of labor phase
persists and wage rates are held down, the profit share must neces
sarily rise--tending to a worsening of the distribution of income.
These arguments have been further buttressed by the actual
historical experience of a substantial number of contemporary LDC's.
Whether we pick the Gini coefficient or McNamara's favorite index
which relates the proportion of total income accruing to the lowest
and highest quartiles, the distribution of income in Mexico, in
Brazil, in the Philippines, in fact, in most LDC's, has been wor
sening over the past decade.

Nevertheless, though expert opinion

23
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is generally as pessimistic as the historical evidence, we need to
reassure ourselves as to whether this record is inevitable in the
nature of things--or, once again, man-made and thus just possibly
avoidable.

Kuznets and Adelman-Morris data, after all; are heavily

policy-distorted, with most LDC's examined remaining under essen
tially import substitution types of policy settings.
What should give us pause is that the old chestnut of an
unequal distribution of income required to generate high saving
We certainly have examples

rates is no longer generally accepted.

of countries--outside of the socialist orbit--which, like Japan and
Korea, have simultaneously experienced high saving rates and a
fairly equal distribution of income.

Most significant surely is

the actual record of one such economy, e.g., Taiwan, which yields
not only remarkably low levels of the Gini coefficient (near .3
rather than .5 as for most LDC's) but the avoidance of any but the
slightest tendency to rise· during the period of fastest growth and
employment generation, i.e., the 1960's.

It is worth noting that

even Adelman concedes that South Korea and Taiwan may constitute
exceptions to the rule--even though she does not go into the reasons.
25
leads us to the conclusion
Our own detailed examination of Taiwan

24

that the inverse U-shaped or Kuznets pattern can be substantially
softened and possibly even eliminated, so that even before the
commercialization point, when labor surplus disappears, the tradeoff between growth and distribution may disappear.

Our analysis is

based on the effort to decompose the overall Gini into factor Ginis, then
linking

changes in these Ginis to such growth-relevant phenomena as
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reallocatio n under dualism, capital intensity and innovationa l bias.
While this is not the place to dwell upon our findings in detail,
our analysis permits us to conclude that a combination of early
concentrati on on agricultura l productivit y increase,alo ng with rural
industriali zation in the dual economy context,can produce this
result.

This follows basically from the fact that, even as real

wages do not rise very much, additional employment opportuniti es are
provided for members of the poorest landless agricultura l families.
The profession is clearly still groping towards a consensus on
how to analyze distributio n and poverty in relation to growth in a
largely rural dualistic setting.

But this should not deter us from

recognizing that a substantial conceptual shift in emphasis has
already taken place in a number of important dimensions.

Some of

these try to incorporate important institution al or non-econom ic
variables into our analytical framework; others focus heavily on
structural and other typological differences among families of LDC's;
still others are trying to use large-scale general equilibrium models
and sensitivity analysis to help us focus our attention on the
important behavioral relations.

But what most of these approaches

have in common is a continuing deemphasis on the brute forces of
capital accumulatio n and rigid Harrod-Dema r type output relations
and an increasing emphasis on the importance of human resources,
technology change, and other sources of flexibility in the system.
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IV

The above gradual shift of the conventional wisdom in develop
ment theory has, of course, had its reflection in the policy arena,
both within the LDC's and among members of the international commu
nity generally.

In the immediate post-war period, we began, neces

sarily, with a good deal of "shooting from the hips," based on a
number of useful but somewhat miscellaneous and unrelated partial
equilibrium concepts. 26

In the SO's and early 60's development

planning became heavily identified with extensions of Harrod-Domar
models embedded in five-year or 20-year perspective plans as re
quired for aid recipient respectability.

With time, the efforts

became more and more sophisticated, leading, on the one hand, to
27
· programming
·
.
·
dynamic
exercises
an d , on t h e o ther, t o th e f ami· 1 yo f
two-gap models associated with the name of Chenery. 28
What most of these models have in common was emphasis on an
aggregative resources calculation to determine how the most develop
ment can be squeezed out of one's endowment, technology and friends
abroad.

This normally requires the acceptance of some level of

national income aggregation at which to operate and, given some
target rate of overall or per capita income growth, the focussing
on a set of strategic variables, e.g., saving, investment, consump
tion, imports, exports, plus the behavioral relations among them,
to determine whether or not the targets are feasible.

If foreign

capital is not available residually in "unlimited amounts," fiscal
plan magnitudes, or the method of elimination: of the "gap between
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the gaps," must be adjusted iteratively.

There is heavy emphasis

on the role of financial resources (and their physical counterpart),
on the gap-filling contributions of the public sector fisc,private
saving and foreign capital, plus on the tyranny of existing produc
tion function relations.

More recent vintages of such development

planning models have, moreover, moved imaginatively with the times,
e.g., by incorporating employment as a social objective and/or by
differentially weighting income gains accruing to different income
strata.

29

At the same time, however, one observes a growing dis

enchantment with the heavy concentration on formal five-year plans-
which usually became irrelevant albatrosses almost before they
could be published--as well as on the academic pastime of fashioning
ever more sophisticated models of the future.

If human resources

are scarce, the question is being asked, would it not be wiser for
planners to spend their scarce energies on policy changes which
might improve the functioning of the system--public and private-
rather than to compute what it is capable of achieving by continuing
to move essentially on its present rails.

Basic to this notion is

the recognition that what really matters--and what determines the
prospects for the future--at least for the mixed economy--is not
the quantity but the quality of what is going on.

Putting more

wine in leaky old bottles just won't do; there usually just isn't
enough wine to go around.

And even if there were, this wouldn't

necessarily address some of the important new dimensions of develop
ment performance.
If parameter change is the major task to which LDC planning
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or policy making should be addressed, this requires a new kind of
flexibility in attempting to mobilize latent innovative human re
sources in both the public and private sectors.

In the public

sector, this is perhaps best accomplished by setting general "rules
of the game," but accompanied by a willingness to decentralize the
important tax cum expenditure decisions and resources to a truly
local level.

In the private sector, this means setting monetary

fiscal and exchange rate policies such that the burdens of allocative decisions falling on civil servants and bank tellers is minimized,
and the creative talents of new, medium, and small-scale entrepreneurs,
both agricultural and non-agricultural, are harnessed to the develop
ment effort.

This, it should be clearly understood, does not con

stitute advice for laissez-faire; rather, a policy of judicious self
restraint and a selection by central government authorities of those
levers and instruments which are most significant in affecting the
total performance of the economy.
The real issue in any society is how to institutionally organize
itself to get the "best" out of the resources, physical and human,
available over time.

In the mixed economy, this means substantial

reliance on the market to achieve whatever goals the society con
siders appropriate.

Even the socialist countries of Eastern Europe

have increasingly realized this.

The alternative, using political

cadres and non-material incentives, is open to only very few so
cieties and then, very likely,only for limited periods of time.
For most developing countries not willing or able to take the
Chinese path, Peter Timmer's apt comment rema_ins valid:

"getting
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relative prices right is not the end of development ; but getting
1130
them wrong often is.

If we are,in fact,convinc ed that the conflicts among the various
social objectives which are now generally considered part of the tex
ture of development

can be substantial ly softened

as a consequence of the things we do, strategies which change the
nature of the growth path should also give us better employment and
distributio nal outcomes.

Getting economicall y disenfranch ised groups

into the act is likely to be beneficial not only from a welfare point
of view and not only for the individuals immediately affected.
It is perhaps necessary in this context to.emphasiz e that the
distinction often made between "radical" and "convention al" solutions
to the problems of unemployment and the maldistribu tion of income is
Land reform and even capital levies may, of

likely to be overdrawn.

course, be helpful; but they differ.only in degree from the decen
tralization of public sector fiscal powers,and interest rate or
tariff reform.

The latter are just as likely to be resisted by the

vested interests, the landlords as well as large-scale industriali sts,
who stand to benefit from the typical narrow growth import substitu
tion policy syndrome.

Our theory is not as yet sufficientl y advanced

to tell us how much of the observed conflict between growth and dis
tribution in most of the developing world is due to the initial in
equality of physical and educational asset ownership and how much
due to the cumulative effects of market imperfectio ns, entrenched
monopoly positions, etc.

Some combination of institution al change

and market improvement may be required to release the energies
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of the economically disenfranchised and thus ensure the kind of
restructuring of the growth path associated with a softening or
even avoidance of the Kuznets inverse U-shaped pattern.
A related question which comes to mind is whether an economy
which is not "up against it," either because of an ample endowment
of natural resources (or ample foreign capital inflow), is as likely
to effect the policy changes referred to.

The most "successful"

examples are, once again, mostly countries which had little choice but
to mobilize their major resource--a highly literate unskilled labor
force--to penetrate international markets for labor-intensive goods.
Many others, on the other hand, faced with the choice of moving to
export substitution vs. continuing along a secondary import sub
stitution path, can continue to count on traditional land-based fuel
to provide adequate growth and are thus tempted to postpone the
difficult decisions required for restructuring.

In those cases,

perhaps even a higher degree of statesmanship is required to con
vince the various parties to the social contract that the employment and income distribution outcomes of continuing on the present
narrow growth path will ultimately he politically and socially
unacceptable--quite aside from the fact that even growth itself will
ultimately have to receive a new, probably outer-oriented, lease
on life.
Policies in the rest of the world have experienced a not un
related set of changes.

U.S. foreign aid legislation, for example,

now stipulates that resources be used to affect only poverty groups,
mainly in the rural areas of the poorest countries, i.e., the
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Fourth World,
another matter.

whether or not such"targeting" is really feasible is
Other bilateral donors have likewise picked their

"targets" in line with current concerns; e.g., Sweden concentrates
on planned parenthood, and even the stately World Bank family is
trying to put at least some of its money where McNamara's annual
speeches have been for some years.

With respect to the more advanced

of the developing countries, the so-called Third World, trade and,
to a lesser extent, private capital movements undoubtedly assume
greater importance than concessional aid.

Here, accordingly, there

has been a growing appreciation that access to mature economy markets,
coupled with a really effective domestic adjustment assistance pro
gram,may constitute the most effective form of a mutually beneficial
interdependenc e.
But, perhaps most important among the not so subtle changes in
LDC policy attitudes is the growing recognition of what. increased
participation in the world economy, via trade, capital and technology
imports, can and what it cannot do.

Such participation can, of

course, give a substantial assist to any development effort; it pro
vides the system with additional options, resources and flexibility;
but the basic issue of whether or not a society's development goals
will be attained is likely to be decided at home.

If an effort is

being made to alter the domestic parameters, foreign capital can,
of course, be helpful in effecting the often painful transition;
it can also--analogou s to an ample natural resources base--help
enable the system to persevere on the old tracks a bit longer.
Either way, the impact is marginal; there are strict limits on what
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the rest of the world can do to affect the performance of the typical

developing economy.

After years of overselling the impact of

foreign aid and foreign capital,

everyone now has a healthier,

more realistic, view of the problems;and the limitations.

The real

danger at present may well be that we overshoot the mark and, while
proclaiming a 'hew international economic order," pave the way for
autarky, on one hand, with not-so-benign neglect, on the other.
This would be especially unfortunate at a time when our understanding
of the development process itself, and of the potential role of
various international "handmaidens," is better understood than at
any other time in history.
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